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Sažetak
Zlostavljanje zatvorenika u Europi: dijagnosticirana, no ne i izliječena 
bolest?
U radu su prikazana razmatranja problema kako prevenirati zlostavljanje 
zatvorenika unutar sustava Vijeća Europe za zaštitu ljudskih prava. Autorica je 
odlučila pisati o ovoj temi iz razloga što su se uvele određene velike promjene 
u zaštiti zatvorenika u posljednjih deset godina. Europski sud za ljudska prava 
(E�t�R) i �dbor za sprečavanje mučenja (�P�) preuzeli su najveću ulogu u            
stvaranju bolje zaštite. E�t�R je proširio interpretaciju članka 3. Europske       
konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava (E��R), dok je �P� postavio neke nove 
standarde koji sada izravno utječu na rad E�t�R. Sud nije bio spreman     
primijeniti članak 3. u slučajevima čiji se predmet odnosio na uvjete pritvora 
i na preventivnu zdravstvenu zaštitu u zatvorima. Uvijek se usredotočio na 
slučajeve namjernog zlostavljanja pritvorenika od strane službenih osoba. 
�kolnosti su se promijenile u zadnjih deset godina. Sud je drastično proširio 
svoju interpretaciju svega onoga što čini povredu članka 3. te se sada oslanja 
na �P�-ova izvješća prilikom utvrđivanja zlostavljanja. �vaj novi pristup u 
E�t�R-ovoj sudskoj praksi pruža potencijalni alat za uvođenje nekih novih          
prava iz članka 3., kao što je to pravo na programe o štetnosti dijeljenja igala 
između zatvorenika koji intravenozno uživaju droge.     
S druge strane, Sud je preopterećen sa slučajevima budući da broj zahtjeva 
konstantno raste posljednjih godina, a čini se kako postoji velika vjerojatnost da 
se ovaj problem neće riješiti u skorijoj budućnosti. E�t�R treba hitnu reformuC H �    
kako bi se mogao nositi s trajnim porastom broja upućenih zahtjeva. �vo je 
bio glavni razlog za donošenje nacrta Protokola br. 14. koji su ratificirale sve 
članice Vijeća Europe izuzev Rusije. Rusija stoga predstavlja glavni zastoj u 
reformiranju sustava Konvencije kao i pojačanju zaštite zatvorenika. Protokol 
br. 14 je trenutno za Vijeće Europe jedino dostupno rješenje kojim bi se 
smanjio broj podnesenih zahtjeva E�t�R-u povodom kojih postupak još nije      
pravomoćno okončan. U isto vrijeme, najveći je broj onih slučajeva pred Sudom 
koji su pokrenut protiv Rusije, a Rusija i dalje ima znatne teškoće pridržavati se 
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postavljenih standarda u zaštiti ljudskih prava. Prosperitet E�t�R-a i njegove   
uloge kao najučinkovitijeg suda za ljudska prava su ozbiljno ugroženi.
Ključne riječi: Europski sud za ljudska prava, članak 3. Europske konvencije 
za zaštitu ljudskih prava i temeljnih sloboda, zlostavljanje 
zatvorenika, �dbor za sprječavanje mučenja, Protokol br. 14. 
Chapter 1: Introduction
The Council of Europe is best known for its work in the area of human rights. 
The first significant European document in this area was the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)�, which 
is still the most important document for human rights protection in Europe. This 
treaty contains guarantees of general applicability which apply to “everyone within 
a state jurisdiction”.� Only the provision of Article 5’s concerning the protection 
of liberty and security of persons directly refers to detainee’s rights. However, the 
ECHR is a fundamental document for protection of persons deprived of their liberty, 
especially because of the work of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR, the 
Court), which provides a purposive interpretation that has advanced the protection 
of detainees to an extent not surpassed at any other regional level or in international 
law.� Another significant document of Council of Europe for protection of detainees is 
the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading 
Treatment and Punishment (hereinafter ECPT).� This Convention owes its origin 
to the obligation contained in Article 3 of the ECHR�, but its main purpose was to 
establish the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (hereinafter CPT). 
The CPT examines the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty with a view 
of strengthening, if necessary, the protection of such persons from torture and from 
inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment.�  The main focus of this paper 
is on the protection of prisoners from ill-treatment as well as from torture, inhuman 
and degrading treatment provided for within the Council of Europe’s documents and 
bodies. The main positive developments in the protection of prisoners resulted from 
the cumulative work of the ECtHR and the CPT, which have created new standards 
for the treatment of prisoners and their detention conditions. Only a decade ago, the 
ECtHR was reluctant to even consider detention conditions when deciding about 
the ill-treatment of prisoners. Nowadays the ECtHR is prepared to choose a more 
active approach as a result of the development.  Even issues such as providing needle 
1 Signed in Rome 4 November 1950 and entered into force 3 September 1953
2 ECHR, Article 1 
� J. Murdoch, The treatment of prisoners, European standards, Strasbourg: Council of  
 Europe Publishing, 2006, 31.
4 Signed in Strasbourg 26 November 1987 and entered into force 1989
5 ECHR, Article 3: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading  
 treatment or punishment.”
6 ECPT, Article 1.
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exchange programmes in prisons have been raised before the Court. However, 
irrespective of all the positive improvements in its work and  less reluctant approach 
to various applications, it might be said that today the ECtHR has become a victim 
of its own success. The Council of Europe now consists of 47 Member States with 
800 million citizens. The number of applications in front of the Court is constantly 
growing and because of that it takes a long time for the Court to produce judgements 
and decisions. This was the reason for drafting Protocol 14 which brings important 
changes to the Convention and its control mechanism. Although Protocol No. 14 
would not solve the problem of the growing number of applications before the Court, 
it is essential for the continued effectiveness of the ECHR system. So far, 46 Member 
States of the Council of Europe have ratified Protocol No. 14; in other words, all but 
Russia. Russia represents the main holdback for reforming the Convention system, 
while at the same time over one-quarter of the applications pending before a decision 
body are against Russia. The problems with Russia do not stop with the number of 
pending applications. Russia is a country with the highest percentage of incarcerated 
persons, while the conditions of their detention facilities are far below any European 
standard. Neither the Court nor the CPT have lowered their standards in order to 
facilitate Russia’s position, however the Russian prison system is still not recording 
any significant progress. Their non-implementation of judgements is creating 
difficulties for the Committee of Ministers, which is in charge of the execution of 
ECtHR judgements. Because of Russia’s prison situation and the attitude of the 
Russian authorities, Russia is likely to endanger not only the viability of the ECtHR, 
but the new developments in protecting prisoners from ill-treatment as well.
Chapter 2: The ECHtR  and the application of Article 3 to the 
treatment of prisoners
Article 3 is one of the few ECHR articles that contains an absolute prohibition of 
the rights (principles) it protects. There is no second paragraph of this Article which 
would allow for exceptions, and the rights contained in it cannot be derogated from 
at any time, even “…in time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of 
the nation…”7 The context in which most violations of Article 3 occur concerns the 
treatment of detainees. The obligations stipulated under Article 3 are most relevant 
in this respect. Detainees are under the full control of the state authorities and are 
therefore at risk of abuse of being abused by them.
The ECtHR and the application of Article 3 in general
When the ECtHR determines whether Article 3 has been breached there are 
two essential questions that need to be posed: First, does the treatment complained 
of meet the minimum level of severity required to give rise to the application of 
7 The ECHR, Article 15 (1)
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Article 3; and second, what is the appropriate label to be applied to the treatment?8 
Whether the treatment constitutes a minimum level of severity must be judged by the 
circumstances of each case individually since it depends on various elements. The 
ECtHR pointed out this opinion and stated: “…The assessment of this minimum is, in 
the nature of things, relative; it depends on all circumstances of the case, such as the 
duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age 
and state of health of the victim.”9 In the Soering case the ECtHR added that severity 
“depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and the context of 
the treatment or the punishment, the manner and method of its execution”10, as well 
as the factors mentioned above. These words have been repeated by the ECtHR in 
numerous cases.�� 
Determining whether a reported treatment met the minimum level of severity 
under Article 3 proceeds by assessing the degree or intensity of the suffering inflicted. 
Since the Convention itself does not define the terms torture, inhuman and degrading 
treatment, the ECtHR undertook to define the terms in question. In one of the major 
cases concerning the ill-treatment of detainees, the ECtHR made a clear distinction 
between the concept of torture and that of inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. The ECtHR defined thus provided the following definitions: Torture: 
“deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering”; Inhuman 
treatment or punishment: “the infliction of intense physical and mental suffering”; 
Degrading treatment: “ill-treatment designed to arouse in victims feelings of fear, 
anguish, and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them and possibly 
breaking their physical or moral resistance”.�� The absence of any evidence of a positive 
intention to humiliate or debase the individual does not rule out a violation of Article 
3, in terms of inhuman or degrading treatment.�� Ill-conceived or thoughtless action 
on the part of the state authorities can also meet the minimum level of severity for a 
violation of Article 3. As regards torture there are three essential elements of torture 
that can be extracted: 1) infliction of severe mental or physical pain or suffering; 2) 
the intentional or deliberate infliction of pain and 3) the pursuit of a specific purpose, 
such as gaining information or intimidation. It represents the most severe and intense 
form of ill-treatment, wherefore the ECtHR is very reluctant to make judgements that 
a certain treatment constitutes torture, and does so only in drastic cases.�� Most of the 
violations against Article 3 represent inhuman or degrading treatment, i.e., a treatment 
8 Murdoch, The treatment of prisoners, European standards, ���.
9 Ireland v. United Kingdom, (1979-1980) 2 E.H.R.R. 25, para. 162.
10 Soering v. United Kingdom, (1989) 11 E.H.R.R. 439, para. 100.
�� For example, Valašinas v. Lithuania, judgement of 24 July 2001, No. 44558/98, 
para. 101; Keenan v. United Kingdom , (2001) 33 E.H.R.R. 38, para. 109;      Labita v. Italy, 
(2008) 46 E.H.R.R. 50, para. 120; �ekin v. �urkey, (2001) 31 E.H.R.R. 4, para. 52.
��  Ireland v. Unitd Kingdom, (1979-1980) 2 E.H.R.R. 25, para. 167.
��  Peers v. Greece, (2001) 33 E.H.R.R. 51, para. 74.
�� For example, in the case Akkoc v. �urkey the victim had been subjected to electric shocks, 
hot and cold water treatment, blows to the head, threats concerning the ill-treatment of her children 
and many other things (paras. 24 and 25).
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that does not have sufficient intensity or purpose to be categorised as torture.
The interpretation of the Convention text is dynamic. Therefore, the notion of 
what constitutes torture, inhuman and degrading treatment has changed over time 
within the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. It is important to read the Convention in terms 
of current expectations, as heightened standards may at present more readily lead to 
the conclusion that certain ill-treatment that might have been labelled as inhuman 
treatment now justifies the application of the label torture, or that the treatment of 
prisoners or detention conditions that used to be labelled as merely unsatisfactory 
might now be regarded as a violation of Article 3. For example, in the case Selmouni 
v France, the ECtHR stated: “Having regard to the fact that Convention is a ‘living 
instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions’, the 
ECtHR considers that certain acts which were classified in the past as ‘inhuman 
and degrading treatment’ as opposed to ‘torture’ could be classified differently in 
future. It takes the view that the increasingly high standard being required in the 
area of the protection of human rights and fundamental liberties correspondingly and 
inevitably requires greater firmness in assessing breaches of the fundamental values 
of democratic societies.”��
Article 3 and the ill-treatment of prisoners
The starting point for assessing whether any ill-treatment of detainees has taken 
place is to determine whether any physical force has been used against the prisoner. 
The ECtHR has set up the rule that recourse to physical force which has not been made 
strictly necessary by the detainee’s own conduct is in principle an infringement of the 
right set forth under Article 3.�� Where a detainee shows signs of injuries or ill-health, 
the burden of proof will be on the detaining authorities to establish that the signs or 
symptoms are unrelated to the period or fact of detention17, or if there has been use 
of force that it was not excessive.18 The ECtHR will have to distinguish treatment or 
conditions that are part of incarceration, and such treatment and conditions which 
impose an unacceptable detriment on detainee.
In the context of detention, the potential for violations of Article 3 arises at 
each stage of detention; from the moment a person is placed under detention to the 
time when a person is released. Ill- treatment may be inflicted during arrest,19 during 
interrogation and police detention20 and it may also be the consequence of various 
detention conditions. What is of particular interest for this article are the conditions 
of detention and how they can amount to inhuman and degrading treatment in the 
context of Article 3. 
�� Selmouni v. France, (2000) 29 E.H.R.R. 403, para. 101.
�� Ribitsch v. Austria, (1996) 21 E.H.R.R. 573, para. 38.  
17 �omasi v. France, (1993) 15 E.H.R.R. 1, paras. 108-111.
18 Rehbock v. Slovenia, (1998) 26 E.H.R.R. CD120, para. 72. 
19 Rehbock v. Slovenia, paras. 71 and 72.
20 Aksoy v. �urkey, Akkoc v. �urkey, Selmouni v. France
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Conditions of detention refer to the general environment in which persons 
are detained, to the prison regime and specific conditions in which inmates are 
kept, and to the specific circumstances of the prisoner. This is an area marked by a 
continuous evolution in the basic standards, since in earlier case-law the ECtHR and 
the former Commission seemed reluctant to conclude that conditions of detention 
violated Article 3.�� First implication that poor physical conditions of detention can 
constitute degrading treatment even if there was no intention to humiliate detainees 
appeared in 2001 in the judgement of Dougoz v. Greece. In this case a convicted 
foreign drug offender was held for 10 months in Drapetsona detention centre and for 
eight months in Alexandras Avenue police headquarters. Both of the locations were 
severely overcrowded and there were no beds, mattresses or blankets. The ECtHR 
unanimously held that the conditions of detention of the applicant at the Alexandras 
police headquarters and the Drapetsona detention centre, in particular the serious 
overcrowding and absence of sleeping facilities, combined with the inordinate length 
of the period during which he was detained in such conditions, amounted to degrading 
treatment contrary to Article 3.”�� Shortly afterwards the ECtHR found another breach 
of Article 3 in Peers v. Greece. The applicant was a British drug addict who was 
detained in a segregation unit for two months while he underwent drug withdrawal 
treatment. The ECtHR determined: “…The ECtHR is of the opinion that the prison 
conditions complained of diminished the applicant’s human dignity and aroused in 
him feelings of anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing him and 
possibly breaking his physical or moral resistance. In sum, the ECtHR considers that 
the conditions of the applicant’s detention in the segregation unit of the Delta wing of 
Koridallos Prison amounted to degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 
of the Convention”.�� This new, more critical approach was subsequently confirmed 
in numerous other cases.��
Article 3 and the right to health care in prisons
Although the Convention does not guarantee the right to health care or the right 
to prisoners’ health care, the ECtHR (and the former Commission) have developed 
certain standards through jurisprudence. First; prison authorities are under a positive 
obligation to protect the health of persons deprived of their liberty, whereas the 
�� See case  Kröcher and Möller v. Switzerland where there have been acknowledged 
 violations of international standards of detention, but no violation of Article 3 was 
 found. Kröcher and Möller v. Switzerland, (1984) 6 E.H.R.R. CD395, paras. 60-77.   
��  Dougoz v. Greece, (2002) 34 E.H.R.R. 61, paras. 46 and 48.    
�� Peers v. Greece, (2001) 33 E.H.R.R. 51, para. 75      
�� For example  Price v. United Kingdom, (2002) 34 E.H.R.R. 53 (detaining a severely 
disabled person in dangerous conditions), Kalashnikov v. Russia, (2003) 36 E.H.R.R. 34    
(overcrowded cell and unsanitary environment while some of the inmates had serious contagious 
diseases), Poltoratskiy v. Ukraine, (2004) 39 E.H.R.R. 43  (general detention conditions- restricted 
living space, no access to natural light, no provision for any outdoor  exercise)
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lack of appropriate medical care may amount to treatment contrary to Article 3.�� In 
addition, delay of providing medical help may constitute a violation of Article 3.�� 
The practical impact of this kind of opinion was limited. In case Kudla v. Poland the 
applicant claimed that he had not been given adequate psychiatric treatment despite a 
report indicating that his continued imprisonment posed the likelihood that he would 
attempt suicide, but the ECtHR did not find a violation of Article 3 since it concluded 
that the applicant received frequent psychiatric assistance.27 On the other hand, in 
that same case, the ECtHR stated: “…(U)nder this provision the State must ensure 
that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for his 
human dignity…and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health 
and well-being are adequately secured by, among other things, providing him with 
the requisite medical assistance...”.28 Securing health and well-being has become 
one of the ECtHR’s principles when deciding about violation of Article 3 regarding 
health care in prisons and nowadays the state’s responsibility to ensure the health 
and well-being of all the prisoners is being considered with much greater care.29 In 
Melnik v. Ukraine the ECtHR emphasized three particular elements to be considered 
in relation to the compatibility of the applicant’s health with his stay in detention: 
“(a) the medical condition of the prisoner, (b) the adequacy of the medical assistance 
and care provided in detention and (c) the advisability of maintaining the detention 
measure in view of the state of health of the applicant”.30 In Yakovenko v. Ukraine 
the applicant complained that he had not received adequate medical assistance for 
his HIV and tuberculosis. The ECtHR stated: “In the ECtHR’s view, the failure to 
provide timely and appropriate medical assistance to the applicant in respect of his 
HIV and tuberculosis infections amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment 
within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention”.�� 
Article 3 permits no qualification, therefore explanations to the effect that 
inadequate conditions are the result of economic or other inherited organizational 
or endemic factors will not justify failings. As the ECtHR stated: “The ECtHR has 
also borne in mind, when considering the material conditions in which the applicant 
was detained and the activities offered to him, that Ukraine encountered serious 
socio-economic problems in the course of its systemic transition and that prior to the 
summer of 1998 the prison authorities were both struggling under difficult economic 
conditions and occupied with the implementation of new national legislation and 
related regulations. However, the ECtHR observes that lack of resources cannot in 
�� �urtado v. Switzerland, Series A no. 280- A (Opinion of the Commission), para. 79.
�� For example Ilhan v. �urkey, (2002) 34 E.H.R.R. 36, paras. 86 and 87.     
27 Kudla v. Poland, paras. 96- 100.
28 Kudla v. Poland, para. 94.
29 For example, Alver v. Estonia (2006) 43 E.H.R.R. 40, Khokhlich v. Ukraine, judgement  
 of 29 April 2003,    No. 41707/98
30 Melnik v. Ukraine, judgement of 28 March 2006, No. 72286, para. 94 
�� Yakovenko v. Ukraine, judgement of 25 January 2008, No. 15825/06, paras. 
 90-102.
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principle justify prison conditions which are so poor as to reach the threshold of 
treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. Moreover, the economic problems 
faced by Ukraine cannot in any event explain or excuse the particular conditions 
of detention which it has found in paragraph 145 to be unacceptable in the present 
case.”�� 
The difficult issue of whether there is a positive obligation to take all reasonable 
steps to prevent the spread of infectious diseases is now coming before the ECtHR. 
Right to needle exchange programmes in prisons
The evolution of the ECtHR’s Article 3 jurisprudence provides a potential tool 
to advocate some new rights, such as the right to sterile syringes for prisoners who 
inject drugs.�� This way of thinking has been generated through recent ECtHR’s case-
law, CPT Reports and of the Recommendations of the Council of Ministers together 
with the growing drug injections problems and spread of transmittable diseases in 
prisons followed by awareness of the possibility for their successful prevention. As 
stated by the Court, the ECHR “compels the authorities of the Contracting States not 
only to refrain from provoking such treatment (inhuman and degrading), but also to 
take the practical preventive measures necessary to protect the physical integrity and 
health of persons who have been deprived of their liberty…(and)it is sufficient for 
an applicant to show that the authorities did not do everything that could reasonably 
have been expected of them to prevent the occurrence of a definite and immediate risk 
to his physical integrity, of which they knew or should have known.”�� This shows 
a state’s positive obligation not only to protect prisoners’ health and well-being, but 
also to make all the possible preventive measures to secure prisoners health. A state’s 
obligation to protect prisoners’ health is not alleviated in any way by the detainee’s 
behaviour, even when his behaviour is unlawful or violates prisons rules. ECtHR.�� 
When it comes to case-law regarding the spread of transmittable diseases, the ECtHR 
has already made a judgement where it found that “prison conditions leading to 
spread of disease can contribute to circumstances amounting to breach of Article 
3.”�� However, contracting tuberculosis while in prison, on its own, is not sufficient 
to establish a violation of Article 337; nevertheless, tuberculosis contagion while 
in prison together with the inadequate medical treatment can and does constitute 
�� Poltoratskiy v. Ukraine, para. 148. 
�� R. �ines,  Injecting Reason: prison syringe exchange and Article 3 of the European 
�onvention on �uman Rights, E.H.R.�.R. (1) 2007, 66-80., 66. 
�� Pantea v. Romania, (2005) 40 E.H.R.R. 26, paras. 189 and 190. 
�� Vlasov v. Russia , judgement of 12 June 2008, No. 78146/08, para. 79;             Rodic and three 
�thers v. Bosnia and �erzegovina, para. 66; Labita v. Italy (2008) 46 E.H.R.R. 50, para. 120.     
�� �ines, Injecting Reason: prison syringe exchange  and Article 3 of the European 
�onvention on �uman Rights, 69., regarding case Kalashnikov v. Russia where the applicant 
contracted a series of skin and fungal infections while incarcerated in a overcrowded prison cell
37 Khokhlich v. Ukraine, judgement of 29 April 2003, No. 41707/98, paras. 183-196.
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violation of Article 3.38  And when we talk about diseases like HIV, that are incurable 
but preventable, the state’s obligation to take all possible preventive measures should 
be expressed even more. These judgments show not only developments in prisoners’ 
health protection, but represent also direct arguments in favour of a prisoners’ right to 
effective measures for prevention of transmittable diseases. Another case in favour of 
a prisoners’ right to needle exchange programmes is McGlinchey v. United Kingdom, 
where the ECtHR found that a failure of authorities to provide Ms McGlinchey 
appropriate medication for her heroin withdrawal symptoms and preventing her 
from suffering or a worsening of her condition, contravened the prohibition against 
inhuman or degrading treatment contained in Article � of the Convention.39 The 
ECtHR treated heroin addiction as a special vulnerability which even increases a 
state’s obligations under Article 3, and this can have “significant implications for the 
possibility of a successful application on the issue of prison syringe exchange.”40
To date, only one case arguing that a state’s obligation to protect prisoners’ health 
includes providing access to needle exchange programmes has been brought before 
the ECtHR. In 2006 applicant John Shelley brought a complaint before the ECtHR 
claiming that the health of prisoners who injected drugs was being jeopardised by a 
lack of access to syringe exchange programmes and that the authorities in the UK had 
failed in their positive obligation stipulated under Article 3 to adequately secure his 
health and well-being.�� The ECtHR declared this application inadmissible, mainly 
because of the fact that the applicant has not specified whether he is at any real or 
immediate risk of becoming infected through unclean or shared needles, nor has he 
claimed to use drugs himself.�� “…(I)t (the ECtHR) is not satisfied that the general 
unspecified risk, or fear, of infection as a prisoner is sufficiently severe as to raise issues 
under Articles 2 or 3 of the Convention.”   �� The Court also found that the difference in 
prison treatment “falls within the margin of appreciation and considers that it may be 
regarded, at the current time, as being proportionate and supported by objective and 
reasonable justification.”�� Nevertheless, the Shelley case highlighted major concern 
for the denial of prisoners (in most countries) of effective preventing measures from 
HIV and other transmittable diseases, placing them at risk of transmittable diseases 
infection and it also indicated that the ECHR can be used to advocate in favour of 
prison syringe exchange programmes as a proven preventive measure. 
38 �ummatov v. Azerbaijan, judgement of 29 November 2007, No. 9852/03 and 13413/04, 
 paras. 108-122.
39 McGlinchey v. United Kingdom, (2003) 37 E.H.R.R. 41, paras. 47-58.
40 �ines, Injecting Reason: prison syringe exchange  and Article 3 of the European 
 �onvention on �uman Rights, 70.
�� Shelley v. United Kingdom, (2008) 46 E.H.R.R. SE16
�� Shelley v. United Kingdom, 207.
�� Shelley v. United Kingdom, 207.
�� Shelley v. United Kingdom ,207.
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Chapter 3: The CPT-working methodology 
and its impact upon the ECtHR’s jurisprudence
Recent developments in the ECtHR’s willingness to find violations of Article 3 
based solely upon poor prison conditions are highly influenced by the work of CPT.
The CPT was established under the European Convention for the prevention 
of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment (ECPT), which has been ratified 
by all Member States of the Council of Europe. The work of the CPT is designed to 
be an integrated part of the Council of Europe system for the protection of human 
rights, establishing a proactive non-judicial mechanism.�� Under the ECPT, the CPT 
is set up to conduct periodic and ad hoc visits in any places under the jurisdiction       
of a contracting state where persons are deprived of their liberty to see how they 
are treated and, if necessary, to recommend improvements. The CPT produces two 
categories of documents: the annual general reports that describe its work during the 
past year and may also contain some substantive issues and general standards, and 
individual country reports arising out of the CPT’s programme of visits. The CPT is 
composed as of many independent and impartial experts as there are States Parties, 
drawn from various professions. 
Working methodology and standards of the CPT
The essential feature of the ECPT is the principle of co-operation between the 
CPT and the State Parties.  Each State Party must permit visits and no reservations are 
allowed in respect of the provisions of the ECPT. When carrying out visits, the CPT 
enjoys extensive powers under the ECPT such as access to the territory of the State 
and the right to travel without restrictions, full information concerning places where 
persons deprived of their liberty are being held, unlimited access to any place where 
persons are deprived of their liberty, including the right to move inside those places 
without restrictions and access to all information available to the States which is 
necessary in order for the CPT to carry out its task.�� Another essential principle of the 
CPT is that of confidentiality. After each visit, the CPT draws up a report on the visit 
and detailed recommendations. The report includes a “request for written response 
from the State, setting out measures taken to implement the recommendations made, 
reactions to comments made and replies to requests for information.”47 That report is 
confidential, unless the concerned Party requests its publication (even in that case the 
personal data must remain confidential, except when the concerned person gives an 
express consent).  Another exception is when a state refuses to co-operate. However, 
�� The CPT Standards, “Substanstive“ sections of the CPT’s General Reports, 
 http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/documents/eng-standards-prn.pdf, �.
��  ECPT, Article 8(2)
47 Preventing ill-treatment, An introduction to the �P�, (CPT, About the CPT, 
 http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/documents/ENG-booklet-scr.pdf), 9.
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the only sanction available to the CPT is the power to make a public statement on 
a state’s continuing failure to take steps to address CPT concerns. Only five such 
public statements have been made to date; two of them in respect of Turkey and the 
three most recent ones concerning the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation 
(in 2001, 2003 and 2007).48 In practice the need for confidentiality has very much 
been diluted by the states which have proved remarkably willing to place most of 
the dialogue into the public arena. The need for principles of confidentiality and co-
operation is of crucial importance for the work of the CPT, since it is not a judicial 
body and cannot bring any binding decisions. Furthermore, the CPT’s visit represents 
simply a stage in an ongoing dialogue, whereas its reports mark the beginning of the 
process and not the end of it.
During its visit the CPT is likely to focus on two issues: Whether there are 
indications suggesting that violence or unnecessary force have been used against 
detainees, and whether detention conditions and treatment regimes are adequate. 
Since it is not the role of the CPT to establish whether there has been a breach of 
Article 3, the CPT has not found it necessary to provide a clear definition of the 
terms torture or inhuman  or  degrading  treatment. Torture is almost exclusively 
used to refer to premeditated, physical ill-treatment employed instrumentally by the 
police with a view to extracting information or confessions or the attainment of other 
specific ends.49 The CPT has used the term torture in relatively few country reports 
and the usage of the term has often been linked to severe ill-treatment.50 The terms 
inhuman and degrading have been reserved for forms of environmental ill-treatment, 
chiefly concerning the conditions in which groups of prisoners are housed.�� 
The CPT has also developed a set of standards that are employed during 
its visits and which apply to all prisoners in all prisons. These CPT standards are 
promulgated in its annual/general reports and in country reports. The first established 
CPT standards were published in the 2nd General Report and they have been further 
developed over time. Those rights are: the right of those concerned to inform a close 
relative or another third party of their choice of their situation; the right of access 
to a lawyer and; the right of access to a doctor. “They are, in the CPT’s opinion, 
three fundamental safeguards against the ill-treatment of detained persons which 
48 ��th General Report on CPT Activities (2001), appendix. 6: Public statement concerning 
the �hechen Republic of the Russian Federation (CPT: Annual General Reports,    http://www.
cpt.coe.int/en/annual/rep-12.htm); 13th General Report on CPT activities (2002-2003), appendix. 
7: Public statement concerning the �hechen Republic of the Russian Federation, (CPT: Annual 
General Reports, http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/annual/rep-13.htm); 17th General Report on CPT 
activities (2006-2007), appendix. 9: Public statement concerning the �hechen Republic of the 
Russian Federation (CPT: Annual General Reports, http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/annual/rep-17.htm)
49 R. Morgan and M. Evans, �ombating torture in Europe: the work and standards of 
the European �ommittee for the Prevention of �orture (�P�), Strasbourg: Council of Europe 
Publishing, 2001, 63.
50 For example, 17th General Report on CPT activities (2006-2007), appendix. 9: Public 
statement concerning the �hechen Republic of the Russian Federation, para. ��
�� Ibid., para. 66
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should apply as from the very outset of deprivation of liberty, regardless of how it 
may be described under the legal system concerned.”��  Some of the standards that 
the CPT has developed concern living accommodation and basic needs��; staffing 
selection, training and management��, provision of an adequate regime of activities�� 
and provision of health care in prisons��. As regards living accommodation and basic 
needs, the CPT has established some rough guidelines, especially concerning the 
size of cellular space57, but they are open to discretionary domestic interpretation and 
the overall regime whereas the period of time that prisoners can spend in a facility 
is also of relevance. In addition, health care in prisons is of crucial importance. The 
importance of health care lies “both in a making positive contribution to the quality of 
prison life and also in helping combat infliction of ill-treatment”.58 In its 3rd General 
Report CPT explained in detail its expectations regarding the medical care of prisoners 
and has thus been devoting a certain portion to health care matters in every country 
report ever since. The cardinal principle for prisoners is their right to health care and 
“conditions comparable to those enjoyed by patients in the outside community”.59 
However, prison health care services should achieve even more than just replicate 
outside community standards, mostly because of the vulnerable position in which 
prisoners are and their very often unstable psychological and physical health. Other 
principles stressed in the 3rd General Report are: Access to a doctor; Patient’s consent 
and confidentiality; Preventive health care; Humanitarian assistance; Professional 
independence and Professional competence.60 When it comes to transmittable 
diseases they have become an issue with AIDS, tuberculosis and hepatitis being 
of considerable concern. The CPT covered these issues mainly in its 11th General 
Report. CPT has expressed its concern regarding the spread of transmittable diseases 
in prisons and pointed out that “…regardless of the difficulties faced at any given 
time, the act of depriving a person of his liberty always entails a duty of care which 
calls for effective methods of prevention, screening, and treatment.”�� 
��  �nd General Report on CPT Activities (1991) (CPT: Annual General Reports,    
 http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/annual/rep-02.htm), para. 36
�� CPT Report to the Polish Government on the visit to Poland carried out by the CPT from                 
30 June to 20 July 1996 (CPT, States: Documents and Visits, http://www.cpt.coe.int/documents/
pol/1998-13-inf-eng.htm, para. 70; 2nd General Report on CPT Activities (1991) , paras. 49 and 50
�� �nd General Report on CPT Activities (1991), paras. 59 and 60.
�� �nd General Report on CPT Activities (1991), paras. 47 and 48.
�� �rd General Report on CPT Activities, (CPT: Annual General Reports,   
 http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/annual/rep-03.htm), paras. 30-77 
57 CPT Report to the Russian Government on the visit to the Russian Federation carried out               
by the CPT from 2 to 17 December 2001 (CPT, States: Documents and Visits, http://www.cpt.coe.
int/documents/rus/2003-30-inf-eng.pdf��, para. ��.  
58 Murdoch, The treatment of prisoners, European Standards, ���.
59 3rd General Report on CPT Activities (1992), para. 38.
60 3rd General Report on CPT Activities (1992), para. 32.
�� 11th General Report on CPT Activities (2000), para. 31.
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The Relationship between the CPT and the ECtHR
The Explanatory Report to the ECPT indicated that the CPT itself was not to 
“seek to interfere in the interpretation and application of Article 3.”�� However, in 
reality there is a two-way relationship between the ECtHR and the CPT. Decisions 
made under the ECtHR guide the CPT, and the findings of the CPT may both stimulate 
petitions and even directly influence the application of Article 3.�� When challenging 
the detention conditions as incompatible with Article 3 requirements applicants have 
sought to rely upon the CPT findings in two situations: When establishing the factual 
background to conditions of detention and in an attempt to persuade the Court to 
condemn the treatment of the applicant through finding a violation of Article 3.�� The 
first sustained attempt to draw on the CPT reports occurred in Delazarus v. United 
Kingdom and Raphaie v. United Kingdom.�� Subsequently, the 1993 CPT Report on 
Greece has been drawn in on number of applications brought against Greece, but 
it was not until 1998 and the Peers v. Greece case when the Commission declared 
a complaint concerning the general prison conditions admissible, and appended 
sections of the CPT reports to its decision.�� Aerts v. Belgium was the first case in 
which the relevance of the CPT’s work has been most directly at issue, albeit it was 
only a partially successful use of the CPT reports in influencing the interpretation 
of the ECHR. The Commission concluded that conditions of detention did indeed 
violate Article 3, and furthermore referred to the CPT report on Belgium of 1994.67 
Although the ECtHR did not endorse this decision, ever since the Aerts case the 
ECtHR has become willing to accept the assistance of the CPT expertise and to 
refer to CPT reports when assessing the impact of conditions of detention upon the 
applicant.68 For example, in the case Kalashnikov v. Russia the ECtHR evaluated the 
question of the adequacy of cellular accommodation by referring to CPT standards69, 
whereas in Poltoratskiy v. Ukraine the ECtHR considered that the findings of the 
CPT delegates relating to the conditions of the applicant’s detention on death row 
should be relied upon.70 Nowadays, the majority of ECtHR’s judgements concerning 
�� ECPT, Explanatory Report (CPT: Reference Documents, http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/
documents/explanatory-report.htm) , para. 27.
�� Morgan and Evans, �ombating torture in Europe: the work and standards of the European 
�ommittee for the Prevention of �orture (�P�), 59.
�� Murdoch, The treatment of prisoners, European Standards, 47.
�� (Unpublished cases)- R. Morgan, and M. Evans, Protecting Prisoners, �he Standards of 
the European �ommittee for the Prevention of �orture in �ontext, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999, 89.
��  (Unpublished Commission decisison)- Morgan and Evans, Protecting Prisoners, �he 
Standards of the European �ommittee for the Prevention of �orture in �ontext, 90.
67  Aerts v. Belgium, para. 81.
68 For example Dougoz v. Greece (2002) 34 E.H.R.R. 61, Mouisel v. France (2004) 38 
E.H.R.R. 34, Kalashnikov v. Russia (2003) 36 E.H.R.R. 34, Poltoratskiy v. Ukraine   (2004) 39 
E.H.R.R. 43  
69  Kalashnikov v. Russia, para. 97. 
70  Poltoratskiy v. Ukraine,   para. ���. 
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detention conditions are supported by CPT reports, both general reports and reports 
regarding a specific country.71 Even if the CPT delegation has not visited the actual 
detention centre where the applicant has been held in, the ECtHR can (and does) use 
the findings made by the CPT upon its visit to the facility similar to the one where 
the applicant is being held.72 All of this suggests that the work of the CPT makes a 
significant and crucial contribution in the area of treatment of persons deprived of 
their liberty and the ECtHR now has the opportunity of understanding the long-term 
impact of poor detention conditions upon individuals. However, the ECtHR is still 
an independent body and it can always disagree with the CPT. Moreover, even if 
it agrees with the CPT’s findings it can choose not to take them into consideration 
when making a judgement. The reason for that is that the CPT mostly considers 
the treatment of prisoners and detention conditions applying generally, while the 
ECtHR’s task is to consider whether the particular individual has been subjected to ill-
treatment. Furthermore, when the ECtHR is in a position to make its own assessment 
of the treatment of a prisoners’ without referring to the CPT findings, it will do so. 
Nevertheless, the contribution of the CPT in protection of prisoners is incontestable 
and extremely important. Its cooperation with the state authorities and with Non-
Governmental Organisations, its unrestricted access to all states’ detention facilities 
and all detainees and the high impact CPT has on the ECtHR’s judgements, has made 
the CPT an important contributor to the protection of prisoners in Europe. 
Chapter 4: The ECHR: a victim of its own success?
What is apparent from the last two Chapters is that the protection of prisoners 
from ill-treatment was going through an ascending path and the Court heightened 
its standards when determining whether ill-treatment occurred. The ECtHR became 
willing to find a violation of the Article 3 based solely on poor prison conditions, 
imposing positive obligation on states to secure adequate health care, including 
preventive health care and well-being of prisoners and it has been relying on the CPT 
reports when deciding whether ill-treatment has occurred. Those are all positive steps 
in the protection of prisoners and they became standards that cannot be derogated 
from, since Article 3 does not allow any limitations or qualifications. Everything 
written so far creates an impression that the situation concerning prisoners and their 
protection is a bright one. Nevertheless, this is only one side of the coin. It might 
be said that the ECtHR has become a victim of its own success. At present, it is 
facing serious problems, most of which started after 13 new states (for the most 
part ex-communist states from Eastern Europe) joined the Council of Europe. Russia 
as one of those states represents the main obstacle to any improvements in human 
rights protection, including the improvement in the treatment of prisoners. Russia 
71 For example, Alver v. Estonia (2006) 43 E.H.R.R. 40, Fedotov v. Russia (2007)  44 
E.H.R.R. 26, Khokhlich v. Ukraine judgement of 29 April 2003, No. 41707/98       
72 For example, Dougoz v. Greece, (2002) 34 E.H.R.R. 61
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joined the Council of Europe in 1996 and ratified the ECHR in 1998, even though it 
was evident that given its underdeveloped democratic and legal institutions, Russia 
was by no means ready to comply with the international or European human rights 
requirements. One of the big concerns of scholars like Mike Janis was that Strasbourg 
institutions would permit a two-tier legal order, with lesser expectations for Russia.73 
However, 12 years after Russian accession to the Council of Europe it appears that 
the ECtHR has not lowered the bar. Its decisions clearly confirm that.74 But, the high 
volume of cases concerning Russia that are submitted to the ECtHR and the Russian 
refusal to ratify Protocol No. 14 of ECHR are placing the effectiveness of the whole 
ECHR system at risk. 
Protocol No. 14 
On 1 November 1998 Protocol No. 11 came into force and became an integral 
part of the ECHR. It provided for a complete makeover of the Strasbourg system, the 
most important features of which are: a) dissolution of the European Commission of 
Human Rights; b) transformation of the ECtHR into a truly permanent, professional 
judicial body and; c) compulsory jurisdiction of the ECtHR, without any special 
declaration, over all individual applications against State Parties to the ECHR.75 
Despite the positive effects of Protocol No. 11, it streamlined the Court’s procedures 
and ensured greater coherency in its case-law, it soon became evident that further 
reform would be necessary. The main reasons for necessity of the new reform are 
that there are 13 new state parties to the Convention (extending its application to a 
further 240 million people, consisting now of 800 million potential clientele for the 
Court) and an ever-increasing number of applications, from within both existing and 
new state parties.76 The Council of Europe adopted various principles instruments 
after Protocol No. 11, which all together represents a package that eventually led 
to the adoption of Protocol No. 14. On 12 May 2004 the text of Protocol No. 14 
was approved for signature. It was designed to give the ECtHR an important tool 
in order to cope with its increasing case load and it has now been accepted by 46 
Member States of the Council of Europe, all except Russia, meaning that the Russian 
stance alone is preventing the reforms set out in the Protocol from being brought into 
effect.77 
73 M. Janis,   Russia and the ‘Legality of Strasbourg’ Law, (1997) E.J.I.�. 93-99, 94. 
74  Ilascu and �thers v. Moldova and Russia, (2005) 40 E.H.R.R. 46; Kalashnikov v. 
Russia, (2003) 36 E.H.R.R. 34; Timishev v. Russia, (2007) 44 E.H.R.R. 37     
75  �. Caflich, �he reform of the European �ourt of �uman Rights: Protocol No. 14 and 
beyond, H. R. �. Rev. 6(2) (2006), 403-415, 403.
76 Explanatory Report to the Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, amending the control system to the Convention, (Council of 
Europe, Explanatory Report to the CETS 194, www.conventions.coe.int), para. 6
77 M. O’ Boyle,  �n Reforming the �peration of the European �ourt  of �uman Rights, 
 E.H.R.�.R., 2008, 1, 1-11, 1.
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Protocol No. 14 brings three main changes to the Convention and its control 
mechanism: 1) In clearly inadmissible cases, admissibility decisions will be taken 
by a single judge, taken from the bench of one-per-member State, instead of the 
current committee of three judges. The single-judge formation will be assisted by 
rapporteurs drawn from the Court’s Registry. The idea of this provision is to increase 
the Court’s filtering capacity, since between 90-95 % of applications received are 
inadmissible; 2) A new, additional admissibility criterion is inserted in Article 35 of 
the ECHR, empowering the Court to declare inadmissible applications where the 
applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage, or when in terms of respect for 
human rights do not otherwise require an examination on the merits by the Court 
and; 3) Expansion of the powers of the three-judge Committees. For repetitive cases 
a committee of three judges could both rule on admissibility and give judgement 
under a simplified summary procedure. Under the current system, judgements can 
only be rendered by seven- judge chambers.78 On 15 November 2006, the Group of 
Wise Persons set up by the Committee of Ministers presented its final report on the 
long term effectiveness of the Convention control mechanism. They recommended: 
greater flexibility for reforming the judicial machinery of the Court; establishment 
of a new judicial filtering mechanism, enhancing the authority of the Court’s case-
law, improvement of domestic remedies and greater use of friendly settlements and 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.79 As David Milner, Directorate General 
of Human Rights and �egal Affairs of Council of Europe pointed out at a meeting 
in Moscow on 12 February 2008, the Wise Persons Report is explicitly based on a 
situation in which Protocol No. 14 has come into force and the Council of Europe has 
no Plan B. He also stressed that in the Court’s assessment, Protocol No. 14 will increase 
its casework capacity by at least 25%. This will not solve the problem entirely, but 
it will certainly help in preventing the situation from getting much worse.80 Without 
a Plan B and without Russian ratification of Protocol No. 14, positive developments 
in human rights protection do not seem possible; moreover, it is more likely that the 
Court’s difficulties will only increase. Hence, it is the more evident that the Council 
of Europe will have to find some other solution to decrease the number of cases and 
speed up the ECtHR judgement making process, so that it can continue its work 
of strengthening the human rights protection. Therefore, the ECtHR’s status as a 
most effective institution for the protection of human rights is at present seriously 
jeopardised. 
78 Explanatory Report to the Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, amending the control system to the Convention, paras. 61-85.
79 Committee of Ministers Documents, 979bis Meeting of Ministries Deputies, 15 November 
2006, Report of the Group of Wise People to the Committee of Ministers, (Council of Europe, 
Committee of Ministers Documents, www.coe.int)
80 Reforms of the European �ourt of �uman Rights: implemented, planned and proposed 
changes in the organisation and functioning of the �ourt, Presentation by David Milner, Directorate 
General of Human Rights and �egal Affairs, Council of Europe, Moscow, 12 February 2008 (The 
Norwegian Helsinki Committee, Reform of the European Court of Human Rights, www.nhc.no) 
1123
M. MAROCHINI, The ill-treatment of prisoners in Europe...
Zb. Prav. fak. Sveuč. Rij. (1991) v. 30, br. 2, 1108-1128 (2009)
Chapter V: Conclusion
After looking at all the presented facts and figures, what can be foreseen as a 
way forward for institutions of the Council of Europe? The ECtHR’s interpretation 
of Article 3 has been going through an ascending path with its case-law in terms of 
protection of prisoners, but can we still expect this trend to continue?  In my opinion 
we cannot expect further interpretative progress and there are two main reasons for 
that attitude which are clearly connected, namely, the current situation with Russia 
and Russia’s refusal to ratify Protocol No. 14, and the growing number of applications 
pending before the Court. 
When Russia joined the Council of Europe it had underdeveloped democratic 
institutions and human rights awareness. Over the last twelve years, there has 
been a certain progress in the authorities’ attitude towards human rights and the 
halting development of democratic institutions. However, Russian citizens are 
becoming increasingly aware of their rights and the role of the ECtHR in protecting 
them, wherefore the number of applications against Russia is constantly growing. 
Unfortunately, the circumstances in numerous prisons are still inconsistent with most 
of the human rights standards. Although the Russian authorities are making certain 
efforts regarding prison conditions and training of their staff, the situation is still far 
from satisfactory. On the other hand, the Russian government is still not accepting 
the role of the Council of Europe’s role in the protection of human rights as they are 
supposed to, as they contest judgements or refuse to ratify Protocol No. 14, all because 
of Russia’s belief in the political background of that judgement and the Protocol.81  
What are the possible solutions for the Council of Europe in dealing with 
Russia? 
One of the solutions might be to amend Protocol No. 14 and to apply its 
procedures only to the states that have ratified it. This kind of situation would be 
a novelty for the Council of Europe and it is not quite clear whether it would be 
possible. It would require a resolution of the Committee of Ministers that would 
authorise the Court to engage a single judge, instead of the current committee of three 
judges and a three-judge formation instead of seven-judge chambers in all the cases 
but the ones against Russia. However, such a resolution would still require Russia’s 
consent and it remains difficult to imagine such an arrangement. For the latter would 
mean that the new admissibility criterion would not apply to applications against 
Russia, thus creating great difficulties for the Court while disturbing the unity and 
harmony within the Council of Europe’s judicial system. Finally, such a resolution 
81 Vladimir Putin at the meeting with the Council to Promote Development of the Civil              
Society Institutions and Human Rights on 11 January 2007 stated: “Unfortunately, our country 
is coming into collision with a politicisation of judicial decisions. We all know about the case 
of Ilascu, where the Russian Federation was accused of matters with which it has no connection 
whatsoever. This is a purely political decision, an  undermining of trust in the judicial international 
system.” http://www.publications.parliament.uk (original Russian page unavailable)      
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would remove any possibility of Russia to ratify the Protocol No. 14 and Council of 
Europe wants to avoid that.
Another possible solution for the Council of Europe would be to suspend Russia 
from membership until it has ratified Protocol No. 14. According to the Statute of the 
Council of Europe: “Every member of the Council of Europe must accept the principles 
of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, and collaborate sincerely and effectively in the 
realisation of the aim of the �ouncil as specified in �hapter I”82 and “Any member 
of the Council of Europe which has seriously violated Article 3 may be suspended 
from its rights of representation and requested by the Committee of Ministers to 
withdraw under Article 7. If such member does not comply with this request, the 
Committee may decide that it has ceased to be a member of the Council as from such 
date as the Committee may determine.”83 However, the Council of Europe is very 
reluctant to suspend a country from its rights of representation and it does so only 
in severe cases of human rights violations, rather than because of a refusal to ratify 
a document, irrespective of the importance of the document in question. Russia has 
already escaped suspension in 2000 when the Parliamentary Assembly called upon 
the Committee of Ministers to suspend Russia unless it immediately halted human        
rights abuses in Chechnya. Even then, after a meeting in Strasbourg, the Council’s 
Committee of Ministers welcomed Russia’s efforts to respond to Western criticism 
of its conduct and made no mention of possible sanctions. It seems very unlikely that 
the Committee of Ministers will suspend Russia simply because of its refusal to ratify 
Protocol No. 14. 
It is obvious that the Council of Europe will have to look for solutions outside 
Protocol No. 14 in order to preserve the ECtHR’s status of being the most effective 
institution for the protection of human rights and to find an answer to the increasing 
number of applications. At this moment, it appears that an impasse has been reached 
by the Council of Europe and the ECHR in particular. 
82 Statute of the Council of Europe, �ondon, 5.V.1949, (Council of Europe, Treaties,  
 http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/001.htm), Article 3
83 Ibid., Article 8. 
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Summary
This article considers of the issue of preventing prisoners from being ill-treated 
within the Council of Europe’s system for the protection of human rights. The reason 
for tackling this topic lies in the fact that there have been some great changes in 
regard to the protection of prisoners within the last 10 years.  The European Court of 
Human Rights (hereinafter ECtHR) and the Committee for the Prevention of Torture 
(hereinafter CPT) played an important role in improving the protection of prisoners. 
ECtHR has extended the interpretation of Article 3 of the European Convention 
for Human Rights (ECHR), while the CPT has generated some new standards that 
now directly influence the work of ECtHR. The Court has been reluctant to engage 
Article 3 to address the question of conditions of detention and preventive health care 
in prisons; it has always focused on cases of deliberate ill-treatment by authorities 
towards detainees. However, the situation has changed within the last decade. The 
Court has drastically extended its interpretation of what constitutes violation of Article 
3 now relies on CPT reports when determining whether ill-treatment occurred. This 
new approach in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence now provides a potential tool to endorse 
some new rights under Article 3, such as the right to needle exchange programmes 
for prisoners who inject drugs.
On the other hand, the Court is overwhelmed with cases and the number of 
applications has been growing constantly during last years, wherefore it does not 
seem very likely that this problem will be solved in the near future. The ECtHR needs 
an urgent reform to deal with the continuing increase in the number of applications. 
This was the main reason for drafting Protocol No. 14 which has been ratified by all 
Member States of the Council of Europe except Russia. Russia thus constitutes the 
main holdback for reforming the Convention system and consequently strengthening 
the protection of prisoners. Protocol No. 14 is currently the only solution available to 
the Council of Europe in order to reduce the number of applications pending before 
the ECtHR. At the same time the majority of cases before the Court are against 
Russia, and Russia still finds it very hard to comply with the human rights standards. 
The prosperity of the ECtHR and its role as the most effective human rights court are 
seriously jeopardised.
Key words:   European �ourt of �uman Rights; Article 3 of the European 
 �onvention for �uman Rights; ill-treatment of prisoners; 
 �ommittee for the Prevention of �orture; Protocol No. 14.
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Riassunto
Maltrattamento dei detenuti in Europa: una malattia diagnostica, ma non 
curata?
Nel lavoro si riflette su come prevenire il maltrattamento dei detenuti all’interno 
del sistema del Consiglio d’Europa ai fini della tutela dei diritti dell’uomo. �’autore 
ha scelto di occuparsi di questo tema, poiché sono stati introdotti alcuni rilevanti 
cambiamenti nel contesto della tutela dei detenuti negli ultimi dieci anni. �a Corte 
europea dei diritti dell’uomo ed il Comitato europeo per la prevenzione della tortura e 
delle pene o trattamenti inumani o degradanti (CPT) ricoprono un ruolo fondamentale 
nella creazione di una tutela più efficace. �a Corte ha esteso l’interpretazione dell’art. 
3 nei casi in cui la questione verte sulle condizioni della detenzione e sulla tutela 
sanitaria preventiva nelle carceri; mentre, il Comitato ha imposto nuovi standards, i 
quali ora influiscono direttamente sull’operato della Corte. �a Corte non era pronta 
ad applicare l’art. 3 nei casi nei quali la questione si riferiva alle condizioni di 
detenzione ed alla tutela sanitaria primaria nelle carceri; si focalizzava, piuttosto, sui 
casi di maltrattamento volontario del detenuto da parte del personale. �e circostanze 
sono cambiate negli ultimi dieci anni. �a Corte ha considerevolmente esteso il raggio 
interpretativo dell’art. 3, appoggiandosi ora ai rapporti del Comitato, ogniqualvolta 
deve accertare un maltrattamento. Questo nuovo approccio nella giurisprudenza 
della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo potenzialmente offre gli strumenti atti 
a riconoscere nuovi diritti ex art. 3, quali il diritto nascente dalla campagna sulla 
dannosità della distribuzione di aghi tra i detenuti, che assumono per vena sostanze 
stupefacenti.     
D’altra parte, la Corte è oberata di casi, poiché il numero di ricorsi negli ultimi 
anni è in costante crescita, per quanto sia molto probabile che tale problema non 
trovi soluzione nel futuro più prossimo. �a Corte necessita, pertanto, una riforma 
urgente, al fine di potere sostenere il costante aumento delle domande alla medesima 
indirizzate. Questa è la ragione fondamentale dell’emanazione del disegno del 
Protocollo n. 14 ratificato da tutti i paesi membri  del Consiglio d’Europa eccetto la 
Russia. Di conseguenza, proprio la Russia rappresenta il principale freno alla riforma 
del sistema della Convenzione, come pure al rafforzamento della tutela dei detenuti. Il 
Protocollo n. 14 rappresenta al momento l’unica soluzione per il Consiglio d’Europa 
per diminuire il numero delle domande rivolte alla Corte ed ancora pendenti. Allo 
stesso tempo, il maggiore numero di casi è costituito proprio da quelli contro la 
Russia; eppure questo Stato continua ad avere notevoli difficoltà nel rispettare gli 
standards imposti dalla tutela dei diritti dell’uomo. �a prosperità della Corte europea 
dei diritti dell’uomo, intesa quale organo giudicante più efficace in materia di diritti 
dell’uomo, rischia di essere seriamente compromessa.
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